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In her contribution to a recent collection of Beckett criticism, Luce Irigaray 
seeks to clarify what might be meant by the pervasive and murky term of ethical 
parlance: “the other.” She wants to preserve its ethical force from a popular, 
desiccated meaning common in everyday speech that promotes something like 
interpersonal respect. Too often, Irigaray says, discussions invoking “the other” 
bypass the sheer difference of another human being and try to shape it into a 
palatable sameness. This tendency is not simply a bad habit perpetuated for the 
sake of convenience; rather, it has deep (and not necessarily bad) roots in Western 
cultures. Irigaray explains that Western cultures, for example, teach that we ought 
to meet visitors with hospitality, as demonstrated whenever we open our homes to 
them and even, if need be, offer them a bed in a “guest room.” This offering, Irigaray 
claims, is entirely on our own terms, and, as magnanimous as it may be, it has little 
to do with encountering the other: “It corresponds to a kind of space for hospitality, 
in fact neutral or indifferent with respect to whoever is coming toward us. We are 
not yet available to the call of the other.”1 If opening my home to a stranger does 
not constitute a meeting with the other, then what, if anything, does?
Irigaray suspects that we have domesticated otherness in order to avoid 
risking our secure sense of self. If I, for example, make a point to befriend people 
whose attitudes differ from my own, they may broaden my own perspective on 
things (again, not necessarily a bad thing, as such), but I remain entrenched in my 
own—somewhat enlarged—subjective position. “To recognize the existence of 
another subjectivity implies recognizing that it belongs to, and constitutes, a proper 
world, which cannot be substituted for mine, that the subjectivity of the other is 
irreducible to my subjectivity.” To what extent can there be contact between self 
and other if our subjectivities are “irreducible”? This is the fundamental question 
of Irigaray’s essay nominally about Beckett entitled “The Path toward the Other,” 
and, as a response, she proposes that such contact is a future possibility that will 
take place outside of one’s own subjective world:
In fact, proximity to the other, with the other, closeness between 
us can be reached when engendering a common world together, 
a world that will not destroy the world that is proper to each one. 
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Here nihilism ﬁnds a positive fulﬁllment. Calling into question 
one’s own world, so as to preserve the existence and the access to 
the world of the other, allows and needs to bring about a nothing 
that will permit the articulation between the two worlds. This 
nothing implies both a “no longer anything of one’s own” and a 
“nothing yet in common.”2
Rather than slipping into an amorphous commonality, Irigaray’s ethical subject 
maintains its own subjectivity in meeting the other and at the same time cultivates a 
“nothing” that preserves the space between self and other. Ethical contact, Irigaray 
asserts, happens between two subjectivities in a space called “nothing.”3
In Irigaray’s essay, “nothing” is the space where one can meet the other in 
such a way that privileges neither party. If this space were originally invested with 
something (rather than nothing), it would no longer be neutral and would tip the 
encounter toward one subjectivity or the other. Importantly, as Irigaray presents it, 
nothing is not devoid of meaning or potentiality: “In order to meet with the other, 
I must ﬁrst let this nothing, which separates us, be, and even restore it.”4 Irigaray 
unfortunately does not fully develop her idea of nothing here, but she suggests that 
it overlaps with a “call” that prompts us to open ourselves to the other.5 Her major 
claim is that my awareness of the limits of my own world can create a threshold 
for meeting the other. This meeting takes the form of an uncertain intimacy that 
jeopardizes my former understanding of myself and my world:
We cannot be with him, or her, without risking everything that 
we are, that we have been, that we are in the present, that which 
we will become. The other cannot be conﬁned to a room of 
guests—in our country, our home, our selves. The other asks 
us to expose our existence, our being, our world to the test of 
being with him, or her. That we open our world, our dwelling, 
our being, in order really to meet with him or her.6
This conception of ethics shifts the emphasis of ethical experience from the 
much-discussed “other” onto oneself and the space between the two. One must 
acknowledge one’s own limited horizon before an encounter with the other in all 
of its alterity is even possible. Irigaray upends the popular calls for respecting the 
other by drawing attention to the foundations of ethical experience, which center on 
self-awareness. By the end of “The Path toward the Other,” however, the speciﬁc 
relation of such an ethics to Beckett’s work remains largely unexplored. How does 
Beckett’s work endorse an ethics rooted in an experience of “nothing” that allows 
for the mutual recognition of self and other?7
In this essay, I want to offer one possible answer to this question. I think it 
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is clear that Beckett does not give us much in terms of an ethical system, but his 
writing thoroughly investigates a productive space we can, following Irigaray, call 
“nothing” that underlies human relations. This space, I claim, is particularly evident 
in the ﬁnal moments of Beckett’s play Ohio Impromptu (1981) when the play’s 
two characters acknowledge each other for the ﬁrst time. The characters arrive 
at this moment of acknowledgment through an act of reading, which in this case 
serves as a model for ethical experience. In the end, I show how Irigaray’s space 
of nothing is restored in an ethical encounter with another human being, and that 
Ohio Impromptu suggests that reading and, by extension, performance can offer 
experiences analogous to such an ethical encounter.  
I.
Like many of his late dramatic pieces, Beckett’s Ohio Impromptu runs less 
than ﬁfteen minutes and creates a striking visual image, which, in this case, features 
two ﬁgures, Reader and Listener, who both sit largely motionless at a white table 
in white chairs. Beckett’s stage direction calls for the two characters to be “[a]s 
alike in appearance as possible” and dressed identically with their long white 
hair hanging over their long black coats.8 Between Reader and Listener one black 
hat sits on the table, and in front of Reader a book is opened to its last pages. The 
primary action and the only words of the play consist of Reader’s reading from this 
book, only to be interrupted by Listener’s six intermittent knocks, each of which 
compels Reader to reread the passage he just read.
After beginning the play with the words “Little is left to tell,” Reader reads a 
story about a man who moves to a “single room on the far bank” “in a last attempt 
to obtain relief” from, presumably, the grief he has endured since the death of 
his beloved, who is later referred to as only “the dear name” and “the dear face.” 
The man feels no relief and some guilt because in his dreams the dear face had 
previously warned him not to move from where they lived together and where, she 
promised, her shade would continue to comfort him. In turn, since his move, his 
“old terror of night [has] laid hold on him again,” and he has been left sleepless 
and disconsolate.9
Then one night an unknown man visits him, saying that he was sent by the 
dear name to comfort him, and then begins reading till dawn from a worn volume. 
He disappears at dawn and then reappears from “time to time” at night to read 
once again a “sad tale” from this volume. Reader tells us, “With never a word 
exchanged they grew to be as one.”10 Eventually, however, the visitor says that he 
“[s]aw the dear face and heard the unspoken words,” namely that he should not 
visit the man again. Reader describes the scene: “So the sad tale a last time told 
they sat on as though turned to stone.” Then Reader says, “Nothing is left to tell,” 
Listener knocks, Reader repeats the same words, and he then closes the book.11 The 
play ends with Reader and Listener raising their heads and looking at each other 
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“expressionless” for ten seconds.
As the play proceeds, we are led to suspect that the man in Reader’s story is 
in fact Listener and that this story is the same sad tale the visitor read to the man. 
But just as much as we are inclined to see connections between what is happening 
on stage and what Reader reads, important differences persist between the two. 
First, we are given no indication of the content of the “sad tale” the visitor reads to 
the man. Also, in addition to the striking coincidence of a ghostly ﬁgure reading a 
story on stage about a ghostly ﬁgure reading a story in the past, the only evidence 
that suggests that the man in Reader’s story could in fact be Listener is their 
mutual sartorial preference for a “long black coat.” The relation between text and 
stage action then parallels the relation between the characters on stage: as alike in 
appearance as possible but clearly not the same.
II.
Ohio Impromptu has in recent years gained more attention due to a ﬁrst-ever 
ﬁlm production as a part of the Beckett on Film series, which in 2001 released ﬁlm 
versions of Beckett’s 19 theatre pieces. Charles Sturridge’s ten minute adaptation 
of Ohio Impromptu stars Jeremy Irons and impressively highlights the contrast 
between the white of the table, chairs, and characters’ hair and the black of their 
coats and the background. This ﬁlm, however, swerves from Beckett’s text in two 
important ways: ﬁrst, one actor plays the two roles and, second, Reader vanishes 
like an apparition at the end. Addressing the ﬁrst point, Strurridge claims that his 
use of one actor enhances the limited script for the stage: “Obviously, on the stage 
you do your best—you can get two actors who are vaguely alike. But shooting a 
ﬁlm I can have two actors completely alike—Jeremy Irons playing both parts.”12 
Difference, however, between the characters is essential to freeing the play from the 
solipsistic view that Jeremy Irons voices in an interview: “I’m playing two parts of 
one person, if you like, the intellect and the heart as they come together in a time 
of grief, face up to loss.” Irons’s perspective here helps explain the thinking behind 
Sturridge’s decision to dispense with Reader at the ﬁlm’s end. After Reader closes 
the book and emphatically repeats, “Nothing is left to tell,” he and Listener look 
at each other “expressionless.” Then street noise and birds’ chirping increase in 
volume as Reader gradually fades without ever moving from his seat. Reader, then, 
quite clearly, is not another human being; he is something like a literary-minded 
angel or perhaps Listener’s unsettled conscience. Sturridge suggests the latter is 
closer to his aim: “I wanted to both draw the audience into the ﬁlm and create this 
extraordinary image of a man talking to himself. I particularly wanted to literally 
encircle the action—to wholly convince the eye that there were two palpable beings, 
who were separate entities, who at the end of the piece become the same.” That 
is, Reader and Listener are one person and their presence as two is in fact illusory 
until the end when their one, single identity is conﬁrmed.13
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In a critical assessment of the ﬁlm, Garin Dowd maintains that Sturridge’s 
interest in presenting Reader and Listener as “the same” undermines Beckett’s 
fundamental concern with “spliced, disjunctive openness.”14 Dowd argues that in 
performance Reader and Listener enact Deleuze’s concept of “counteractualization,” 
which creates a productive distance between act and event. For Dowd, the play 
is concerned with the space between actualization and counteractualization or 
rather with the breach between “same” and “other,” on which rests the ethics of 
difference that Irigaray puts forth. In short, Beckett’s Ohio Impromptu derives its 
dramatic energy from its resistance to claims for unity and resolution. The ﬁlm, 
for all of its visual achievement, eradicates the possibility of the play’s enactment 
of an encounter of ethical experience. In fusing Reader and Listener, the ﬁlm runs 
roughshod over the productive space between self and other that Beckett’s text 
creates.
This space, in my reading, emerges most clearly in the contrast Beckett creates 
in the play’s ﬁnal movement between the characters in Reader’s story and those 
on stage. First, in Reader’s account, after the visitor’s last night of reading the sad 
tale to the man, their interaction ceases altogether:
So the sad tale a last time told they sat on as though turned to 
stone. Through the single window dawn shed no light. From the 
street no sound of reawakening. Or was it that buried in who 
knows what thoughts they paid no heed? To light of day. To 
sound of reawakening. What thoughts who knows. Thoughts, 
no, not thoughts. Profounds of mind. Buried in who knows 
what profounds of mind. Of mindlessness. Whither no light can 
reach. No sound. So sat on as though turned to stone. The sad 
tale a last time told.15
In response to the ﬁnal reading of the sad tale, both the man and his visitor close 
themselves off from their surroundings. They have ﬁguratively “turned to stone” 
and lost themselves so thoroughly in “profounds of mind” that neither the light of 
day nor the sounds from the street could affect them. Adam Seelig has commented 
that at this point these characters “are passive victims of their own text, unable to 
stop the inevitable conclusion that recites their eulogy while they become their own 
tombstones.”16 Their brooding silences them, cuts them off from their senses, fosters 
mindlessness, and petriﬁes them. Among other things, the characters in Reader’s 
tale demonstrate a strikingly unresponsive act of reading. In effect, their response 
to reading isolates them and drains them of their humanity. 17
In his professorial days at Trinity College, Beckett wrote in his study of 
Proust that habit counters the strangeness of life. Habit, he says, works to unify 
perceptions under a familiar umbrella and, therefore, gives us a sense of security. 
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On this point Wolfgang Iser comments, “If this need for security gives rise to 
our projecting a meaning onto the objects before us, then we automatically shut 
ourselves off from those experiences that can arise if we allow the objects to work 
their effect on us without sheltering behind our preconceptions of their meaning.” 
When readers refuse to carry their response from the depths of the text to what 
Iser calls “the experience of contingency,” then reading is a limiting—or even a 
petrifying—experience. Reading demands an active response; Iser writes, “We can 
only talk of experiences if our preconceptions have been modiﬁed or transformed 
by them.”18 From this perspective, the characters’ response to the sad tale is devoid 
of experience.
The alternative to the “buried” response to reading is opaque but makes for 
the striking climax that concludes Ohio Impromptu. Throughout the play, Reader is 
steady and conscientious of his task of reading. The only diversion from Reader’s 
text is an exclamation reﬂecting his careful reading: “In this extremity his old terror 
of night laid hold on him again. After so long a lapse that as if never been. [Pause. 
Looks closer.] Yes, after so long a lapse that as if never been.”19 In the next line, 
Listener reins in Reader’s scrupulousness as the former begins to track down a 
reference noted in his book. Beckett emphasizes the deliberate nature of the reading 
he envisions when he suggests in a letter to David Warrilow, the ﬁrst actor to play 
Reader, that he read “calmly, soothingly, like a bedtime story.”20 The effect of such 
careful reading comes forcefully in the play’s ﬁnal moments. After recounting how 
the man and the visitor responded to the last telling of the sad tale, Reader makes 
two attempts to close the book and says, “Nothing is left to tell.” Listener knocks 
a ﬁnal time, but since Reader has already closed the book, he remains silent. The 
stage direction then indicates that after ﬁve seconds, “Simultaneously they lower 
their right hands to table, raise their heads and look at each other. Unblinking. 
Expressionless.”21 As similar as Reader’s story has been to what we see on stage, 
this closing action makes for a pointed contrast. Instead of ﬁguratively turning to 
stone and solipsistically entering “profounds of mind,” here Reader and Listener 
look at each other. In his review of the ﬁrst production at Ohio State University, S. 
E. Gontarski says that the characters at this moment “suggest more mindfulness 
than mindlessness.”22 Similarly, Anna McMullan claims that this ending “tends 
to emphasize the persistence of consciousness, rather than unconsciousness.”23 A 
response to reading that effects mindfulness and consciousness signals the kind 
of ethical experience that Irigaray describes, which resists the domestication of 
the other in the service of identity. In short, through their silent, expressionless 
stares at the end of the play, the characters open themselves to the presence of 
an other. They acknowledge difference and risk losing the security of their own 
stable identities.
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III.
I want to argue that this closing mutual gaze in response to reading effectively 
restores the nothing that Irigaray identiﬁes at the center of ethical experience. First, 
however, I must acknowledge the spareness of this play; indeed, all the audience 
sees at the play’s end is two characters staring at each other, and, moreover, there is 
no clear indication that this is a positive development. Their intent, expressionless 
gaze lasting ten seconds reveals nothing. Yet this revealed nothing, I claim, is just 
that space that places a subject at the threshold of ethical experience.
Beckett, of course, is known perhaps more than any other writer for paring 
away at representation as far as possible in order to present in writing something 
very close to nothing. In his famous letter to Axel Kaun in 1937, he asserts, 
more and more my own language appears to me like a veil that 
must be torn apart in order to get at the things (or the Nothingness) 
behind it. . . . [L]anguage is most efﬁciently used where it is 
being most effectively misused. As we cannot eliminate language 
all at once, we should at least leave nothing undone that might 
contribute to its falling into disrepute. To bore one hole after 
another in it, until what lurks behind it—be it something or 
nothing—begins to seep through; I cannot imagine a higher goal 
for a writer today.24
Nothing is not privation here; it has a positive value, albeit one that eludes deﬁnition. 
The goal to somehow express nothing drives Beckett for most of his writing life. 
Twelve years after writing this letter to Kaun, he similarly describes the artist’s 
dilemma in a dialogue with Georges Duthuit: “The expression that there is nothing 
to express, nothing with which to express, nothing from which to express, no 
power to express, no desire to express, together with the obligation to express.”25 
Or more basically: how does a writer express nothing when his only materials are 
something—namely, language?
Eric P. Levy claims that Beckett succeeds on this point by creating what Levy 
calls a “mimesis of seeing nothing,” in which a subject sees nothing, but this seeing 
reverses itself so that the subject reveals nothing in his or her own self-image. 
Nothing is not merely a description of an outer world; instead, it impinges on the 
subject’s own identity: “That is, the recurrent motif of seeing nothing or ‘staring 
out at nothing’ not only signiﬁes perception of the outer void, and, by extension, 
perception of inner emptiness, but also assimilates the staring subject to the status 
of a reﬂection, ‘staring back sightlessly’ from the mirror it inhabits.” Levy traces 
this movement as it takes a variety of forms throughout Beckett’s work. Drawing 
on Malone Dies, Levy concludes that “‘nothingness’ now refers to an inward state 
enabling communication with a region of identity which paradoxically negates 
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the very notion of identity.” Nothing in Beckett, then, undoes the subject: “seeing 
nothing,” says Levy, “has become no more than a metaphor for an interiority so 
recessed that it has withdrawn even from its own content.”26 In this interpretation, 
the external world is an instrument used for self-discovery (though, it must be said, 
a discovery unlikely to foster any sort of positive growth).
Perhaps this description of nothing could satisfy the interaction between the 
man and the visitor in the read tale in Ohio Impromptu, but it does not ﬁt Reader 
and Listener’s mutual openness at the end of the play. Nothing is the space between 
these characters, and it is apart from either character’s subjectivity. Besides the 
mimetic interiority that Levy describes, there is also in Beckett’s work, as Ohio 
Impromptu demonstrates, a nothing that resists all subjective appropriation, even 
when such appropriation dissolves the self. This other version of nothing has much 
in common with the ethical space that Irigaray claims has been overlooked by 
the philosophical tradition that has associated men with fullness and women with 
absence.27 Much of Irigaray’s work is devoted to recasting this negative space of 
femininity as the space of ethical relations. For example, in her critical reading of 
Emmanuel Levinas in An Ethics of Sexual Difference, Irigaray retrieves the act of 
the caress from what she sees as Levinas’s metaphysical, masculinist grasp.28 The 
caress, she claims, takes place between two distinct individuals, neither of whom 
is privileged over it. It is a “nocturnal experience of touching” because it can see 
only nothing and so stays squarely outside of either subjectivity.29 For Irigaray, 
the nothing with which Freud identiﬁed women serves as the wellspring of ethics 
because it exists as a nondominative space between uniﬁed subjectivities.
I am not claiming that Beckett’s work actualizes an ethics of sexual difference 
but rather that Irigaray provides a way of understanding the negative space outside 
of individual subjectivities that Beckett’s work repeatedly presents. In addition 
to Ohio Impromptu, an example of this sort of space comes through in Beckett’s 
short poetic prose piece (and, indeed, libretto) entitled “neither,” which Beckett 
wrote for the composer Morton Feldman in 1976.30 It begins by describing a 
nonrepresentational space outside of all subjectivity: 
To and fro in shadow from inner to outershadow
from impenetrable self to impenetrable unself by way of neither.
The entire text, only half a page in all, focuses on this space whose only sound is 
“unheard footfalls”:
till at last halt for good, absent for good from self and other
then no sound
then gently light unfading on that unheeded neither
unspeakable home[.]31 
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The silent space of “neither” is nothing, yet it is an “unspeakable home” that 
exists outside of both self and other. It is unspeakable because it must exist apart 
from any representation that would make it something. For Beckett, nothing is 
always there, ever resistant to attempts to conceptualize it or bring it under one’s 
subjective control.
The ﬁnal lines of “neither” suggest the proximity of nothing to death, “at last 
halt for good.” “neither” stops short of indicating a negative space between self 
and other apart from death. In 1981, before writing Ohio Impromptu, Beckett wrote 
a short play entitled Rockaby, which, like “neither,” discounts a productive space 
between self and other and, accordingly, adumbrates death. In Rockaby, a woman 
(W) sits on a rocking chair that rocks mechanically, as she listens to a recorded 
voice (V) that relates the tale of a woman’s (presumably W’s) descent toward death. 
Through it all, W’s face is “white [and] expressionless,” and her “unblinking gaze” 
gradually subsides as her eyes close near the end of the play. Over the course of the 
play, W calls for “More” three times after V’s long pauses, creating four sections 
to the narrative, which consistently echoes its own words and speech rhythms. In 
V’s story, the main character, a certain “she,” is never deﬁnitively pegged as the 
character rocking on stage, but their commonalities are even greater than those 
of the characters of Ohio Impromptu. The play’s opening section introduces the 
woman as someone in search of another person:
going to and fro
all eyes
all sides
high and low
for another
another like herself
another creature like herself.
This effort fails, and, at the end of the day, “time she stopped,” a line both W and 
V speak together. In the next section, the woman (“she”) again looks “for another,” 
but this time she is “back in” and seated at her window. She continues her search 
at the window in the third part of the narrative, and at this point she redeﬁnes her 
desire so that now simply seeing the eyes of another would be adequate:
never mind a face
behind the pane
famished eyes
like hers
to see
be seen.
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In the ﬁnal section, she lets down the blind, settles herself in her mother’s rocker, 
and slowly closes her eyes. In the end, as W continues to rock with her eyes now 
entirely closed, the voice says that she “was her own other / own other living soul” 
and that ﬁnally she was “saying to the rocker”:
rock her off
stop her eyes
fuck life
stop her eyes
rock her off
rock her off.32
The harsh assessment, “fuck life,” is particularly acid here as it contrasts so sharply 
with V’s otherwise soft, rhythmic tone and as W seems to be close to death. In the 
end, the woman’s attempt to meet another person falls short, and her only recourse 
is to turn inward. Reﬂecting on this play, Ruby Cohn says, “From cradle to grave, 
we seek another, and sometimes, for a while, the blinds are up, but like Everyman 
in the medieval morality play, we die alone, when the bough breaks.”33
In Rockaby, the woman fails to encounter an other. She fabricates an other 
in herself (indeed, it is possible that V is a manifestation of that other), but such 
a turn is ultimately claustrophobic and deadly. In the absence of encounters with 
other human beings, she lacks access to a negative space outside of herself that can 
provide the grounds for ethical experience. In the absence of such a space, death 
is the only possibility outside of oneself. Ohio Impromptu, written shortly after 
Rockaby, examines what might happen if a person actually encountered “another 
like herself.” What if W’s “[h]uge eyes in white expressionless face” met the gaze 
of another human being and resisted the steady pull to close?34 In Ohio Impromptu, 
Beckett presents the possibility for an encounter between two individuals in a space 
that is outside of both subjects and yet provides an intimacy that, like death, deﬁes 
logical conceptualization.
IV.
In his study Very Little . . . Almost Nothing, Simon Critchley maintains that 
Beckett’s language steadily distances itself from a speaking subject and opens 
readers to an impersonal void resembling Levinas’s il y a. Levinas explains his idea 
of the il y a (“there is”) by imagining what would happen if “all beings, things, and 
persons revert[ed] to nothingness.” “Levinas,” Critchley says, “claims that this very 
nothingness of all existents would itself be experienced as a kind of presence: an 
impersonal, neutral and indeterminate feeling that ‘quelque chose se passe,’ what 
he calls in Le temps et l’autre, “An atmospheric density, a plentitude of the void, 
or the murmur of silence.”35 Il y a is a rustling of being that precedes all being and 
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manifests itself in the ethical call of the other. For Levinas, the face of the other 
communicates the radical exteriority of the il y a (it is irreducible to conceptual 
understanding) and at the same time commands one to respond (“To recognize the 
Other is to recognize a hunger. To recognize the Other is to give”).36 Like Irigaray, 
Levinas understands an encounter with the other as a rupture of subjective identity: 
“Responsibility for the others has not been a return to oneself, but an exasperated 
contracting, which the limits of identity cannot retain.”37 For Levinas, the il y a 
emerges in the face of a human being, which is bare, vulnerable, and entirely other 
than myself. The other commands me to respond to him or her, indeed, to substitute 
myself for him or her, which effectively breaks my cognitive grasp of the world. In 
Critchley’s account, Beckett does not derive ethics from the il y a, but he does in 
his own unsystematic and distinctively literary way acknowledge something like 
the il y a at the root of human existence.
As different as their literary and/or philosophical projects are, Levinas, 
Beckett, and Irigaray are all interested in addressing the negative space that exists 
between people but withdraws from claims of logic and deﬁnition. At the end of 
Beckett’s Ohio Impromptu, the characters’ silent acknowledgment of each other is 
an ethical relation born out of the negative space between them, which, as Irigaray 
describes, is an afﬁrmative inﬂection of difference. For Irigaray, difference alone, 
however, is unable to support the ethics she envisions because it is rooted in an 
economy of difference, which is the inverse of and so bound to an economy of the 
same. Even Levinas’s formulation of the il y a, which attends to the sheer alterity 
of the other, is weighed down by the masculine pronoun il, thus inscribing it in a 
limiting gendered scheme. Irigaray focuses on sexual difference as the locus of 
ethical thinking that can exist outside the logic of sameness and difference. As 
Krzystof Ziarek writes, “Sexual difference becomes the difference that crosses all 
other differences, tracing across the differential play of meaning according to an 
other economy of proximity.”38 Proximity is Irigaray’s term for an ethical relation 
outside of the stagnant relation of sameness and difference. It is marked by “being 
two” in contrast to conceptions of being that privilege unity and identity. Proximity, 
in eschewing the logic of identity that governs deﬁnition, gains its force from the 
unspoken, from everything that eludes the strictures of propositional language. 
In other words, proximity describes a relation between two individuals that takes 
place in virtue of the restored nothing, the negative and nonappropriated space 
between them.
In her essay “The Intimate Requires Separate Dwellings,” Irigaray describes 
what a proximate relation might look like between people. Echoing her thinking 
in her Beckett essay on relegating the other to “a room of guests,” she writes, 
“To include the other in my universe prevents meeting with the other, whereas 
safeguarding the obscurity and the silence that the other remains for me aids in 
discovering proximity.” Proximity is the threshold between self and other; it is 
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what one experiences when one acknowledges the limits of oneself in an encounter 
with the other. That there is an irreducible difference between self and other “gives 
access to a path from the one to the other and to the sharing of a still free energy and 
space. Only in what is still independent of the inﬂuence of someone, may proximity 
take place as event and advent. Something comes to pass which does not belong as 
one’s own to the one or to the other.”39 Proximity is nothing because it escapes the 
logic of identity that deﬁnes things; it happens as an event that cannot be pinned 
down by any concept. The proximity between self and other defeats language, 
which leads Irigaray in “The Path toward the Other” to assert: “This nothing ﬁrst 
wants a silence. Silence is not only a privation of words, not only that which has 
not yet come to language; silence is the word, or the speaking, of the threshold—a 
space of possible meeting, of possible hospitality to one another.”40 The space of 
the ethical encounter is proximity and, therefore, since it resists conceptual thought, 
nothing. One meets the other in silence because the other is irreducibly other and, 
as far as we know, outside of all categories of discourse. Silence is an opening; it 
marks the point of contact between self and other in the space of proximity where 
nothing emerges.
When Reader and Listener look at each other silently at the end of Ohio 
Impromptu, they enact the threshold of ethical experience. They maintain a distance 
and do not attempt to appropriate the other into one’s own world. The experience 
of reading that they perform contrasts with the reading described in Reader’s 
tale in which the man and the visitor “grew to be as one.”41 On stage, contrary to 
Sturridge’s ﬁlm adaptation, the characters are different and distant. That, however, 
does not mean that they are indifferent to one another even as they silently hold 
each other’s gaze and refuse to appropriate each other. In the space between Reader 
and Listener, in the silence and in the aftermath of the reading, a tension emerges 
that can only be described as nothing, a disruptive event irreducible to conceptual 
thought. In I Love to You, Irigaray writes of intersubjective recognition, “I recognize 
you means that I cannot know you in thought or in ﬂesh. The power of a negative 
remains between us.”42
Finally, as a way of merely raising and hardly exhausting the fruitful issue 
of how the negative space might carry over in performance, I would like to 
acknowledge a seemingly minor bit of stagecraft that concretely insists throughout 
the play on the difference between Reader and Listener. Beckett added the direction 
“Black wide-brimmed hat at centre of table” in his third draft, penciled in above 
the typescript.43 The only other major staging change in this late draft gives the 
characters white hair rather than gray, which suggests that Beckett was at this point 
very conscious of maximizing the play’s contrasts. Apart from Reader’s book, 
the hat is the only prop in this play, and from the audience’s perspective it serves 
as a physical boundary between the two visually similar characters. As the hat is 
placed in the middle of the table, it also serves as a boundary between the actors 
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and the audience. Thus, the audience ﬁnds itself caught up in the ethical experience 
unfolding before its eyes: just as Reader and Listener silently look at each other, 
the audience has for the past ﬁfteen minutes been silently looking at Reader and 
Listener. What might it mean for the audience to acknowledge the actors through 
the space between it and them?
In his study of phenomenology and performance, Bodied Spaces, Stanton B. 
Garner, Jr. maintains that Beckett consistently reserves a place for human beings 
amid things—like a discarded hat—of the world: “As Beckett pares away at scenic 
and characterological naturalism through his theatrical via negativa, in other words, 
it is the human presence—what Molloy calls ‘that unstable fugitive thing, still 
living ﬂesh’—that limits objectiﬁcation and formal reduction.” In performance, 
the actors must to some extent hide their ordinary selves, but, at the same time, 
the characters are embodied only in virtue of the human beings who step on stage 
as actors. “Thus,” Garner writes, “the performing body occupies a paradoxical 
role as both the activating agent of such dualities as presentation/representation, 
sign/referent, reality/illusion and that which most dramatically threatens to collapse 
them.”44 In Beckett, the human that the audience seeks to acknowledge is not fully 
present; instead, it evades its own presentation as part of the complex dynamic 
of theatrical performance.45 On stage, the ethical recognition of human presence, 
as I have shown, demands proximity, which maintains a difference and distance 
between self and other. This relation, however, is not limited to the action between 
characters on stage. In attending to and demarcating the space between audience and 
actors, Ohio Impromptu anticipates Catastrophe (1982), Beckett’s next play, which 
ends with its central character, Protagonist, raising his head and staring straight 
into the audience to the sound of loud, artiﬁcial, recorded applause. In so doing, 
he, in James Knowlson’s words, resists domination and “reasserts his humanity 
and his individuality in a single vestigial, yet compelling movement.”46 In this 
concluding action, the audience recognizes the human presence in the character. 
This recognition, however, can only ever be partial, as the distancing frame of a 
rehearsal within a play serves to ensure. A partial rather than a total recognition is 
not a failure but instead the hallmark of an ethical encounter, given the prohibition 
against reducing the other to one’s own way of thinking. The ﬁnal action of 
Catastrophe insists on the distance between the human presence in the character 
playing a character and the audience as it meets his gaze. Distance here between 
audience and actor parallels the distance between the characters in Ohio Impromptu 
as they exchange an expressionless gaze. In both cases, ethical acknowledgment 
of the other demands a respect of the other’s difference from oneself that could 
very possibly upend one’s view of the world. For this reason, Irigaray insists that 
meeting the other and, indeed, ethics are invariably risky pursuits. 
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